S eemingly plagued by newness, the law, it is often claimed, cannot keep up with new technology. Digital technologies have only reinforced the legitimacy of this now well-established idiom. The sentiment has gone unchecked for decades, even in light of social and historical research that reveals the cultural nature of technology. In the field of law and technology (cyberlaw), the theory of technological exceptionalism is used to measure whether new technologies are transformative enough to uproot existing legal foundations. This article is an attempt to disconfirm technological exceptionalism as a viable theory for cyberlaw research and policymaking by analyzing a number of information and communication technologies often labeled "exceptional," including the printing press, the internet, photographic cameras, computers, and drones. If technologies can be exceptional -if their attributes drive social change and laws -the same linear pattern should appear across cultures where the technology is introduced: a technology enters society and allows for certain activities that place significant strains on social orders, existing law and legal concepts are applied but fall short, and necessary changes are made to account for the new technological capabilities. Because the theory of technological exceptionalism does not hold up -because the story of law and technological change is much more varied, messy, and political -it should be discarded and new theories of and approaches to law and technological change, such as the legal construction of technology, should be pursued.
Introduction
Are driverless cars new? How new? New enough to need new laws or legal treatment? Why? A room of government and corporate stakeholders, roboticists, and technology researchers grappled with this unstated, undercurrent of a question at a workshop in D.C., an attempt to get moving on ethics and policies for autonomous systems. 1 As one might expect, industry representatives explained the way in which cars were already sold with a great deal of computing power and autonomous functions like parallel parking, cruise control, and reverse braking systems. Others in the room pointed out the potential transformation of the workforce, traffic and public transportation, urban planning, safety and insurance issues, and privacy and security policy. Sometimes a technology so innovative, we are told, that it cannot be proactively regulated, for how are policymakers to understand its technical complexities or know its potential. But at that meeting and in reference to driverless cars, the implications of the answer to the question seemed and, to some degree, Lawrence Lessig, "essential qualities" of technology "drive the law and policy conversations that attend them." 5 The task for law scholars, lawyers, stakeholders, and policymakers is then to identify those qualities as they arise and adapt the law accordingly. But, as Tim Wu writes, exceptionalism depends on what you might think it is an exception to. 6 This article is an attempt to disconfirm technological exceptionalism as a viable theory for cyberlaw research and policymaking by analyzing a number of information and communication technologies often labeled "exceptional" across cultures, including the printing press, the internet, photographic cameras, computers, and drones. If technologies can be exceptional, if their attributes drive social change and laws, the same linear pattern should appear across cultures where the technology is introduced: a technology enters society and allows for certain activities that place significant strains on social orders, existing law and legal concepts are applied but fall short, and necessary changes are made to account for the new technological capabilities. This theory does not hold across cultures, technologies, or time periods -a great deal of variation and messiness is found when looking at the same technology in different times and places.
The cultural construction of technology is overwhelmingly overlooked or flat out rejected by cyber exceptionalism and sociolegal studies. For instance, renowned legal and society scholar Lawrence Friedman distinguishes the law's inability to be seamlessly transported across cultures with technology's ability to do so: "An automobile is an automobile is an automobile, whether it is in Tokyo or Moscow or Buenos Aires or New York. A cell phone is a cell phone; a computer is a computer. There is no such thing as a
Chinese cultural cell phone, or a Brazilian style of computer." 7 But, Sheila Jasanoff explains from a science and technology studies (STS) perspective:
The world is not a single place, and even "the West" accommodates technological innovations such as computers and genetically modified foods with divided expectations and multiple rationalities. Cultural specificity survives with astonishing resilience in the face of the leveling forces of modernity. Not only the sameness but also the diversity of contemporary cultures derive, it seems, from specific contingent accommodations that societies make with their scientific and technological capabilities. 8 Like the fields of communications and media studies of the 1920s through the 1980s driven to uncover the "effects" of media and the "impacts" of computer mediated communications, 9 cyberlaw scholars largely investigate how a "new" technology affects or impacts society and in turn law. Unlike the fields of media studies, communication, information science, and STS, the relatively new and innovative subfield of cyberlaw has not moved beyond technological determinism to similarly embrace the cultural construction of technology. STS and related fields have encouraged mutual-shaping approaches like co-production 10 in an effort to acknowledge and appreciate both the material nature of technology and the social construction of technology, but technological determinism continues to dominate the way in which legal scholars and policymakers assess technological change across society and within law and policy-making arenas and processes.
When Merritt Roe Smith and Leo Marx asked "Does Technology Drive History?" in their 1994 collection, they were confronting a resurgence of technological determinism, which had fallen out of favor for STS scholars and given way to uncovering and understanding the social aspects of science and technology.
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The answer, though complicated and evolving, is no. Technology is not the locus of historical agency. In this article, I argue that technology does not drive law either. Technology is not the locus of legal agency.
When testing the theory of technological exceptionalism, no technology has even been exceptional. We must figure out a new way to answer the question, "Are driverless cars new?" Because, technological exceptionalism is not up to the task. Instead of analyzing whether technologies are or will be exceptional and in addition to analyzing how the law can and should respond to exceptional or conservative technological For a brief time during the 1970s, different winds were blowing in legal academia. Lawrence Tribe in a book entitled Channeling Technology through Law, discussed the "Technological Assessment" approach.
Technology assessment undertakes a broader approach to the evaluation and regulation of new technologies that does not focus on specific technologies. Yet, in the decades to follow, the legal approach to new technologies did not follow this lead, instead it remained technology-specific.
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Until recently the debate around technological exceptionalism has been not whether it exists, but when it exists. When is a technology so new and so different that it will drive significant legal change? When is a technology so novel that the law, as established, breaks and cannot account for it?
Giving the theory of technological exceptionalism its own focus and finding one's footing within this conversation matters, because it shapes how socio-technical legal problems are imagined and shaped and how they are answered. If you think that technology creates problems, you can probably conceive of how technology solves problems. Alternative theories and methods will be revisited at the end of the article, but the article's (eventual) sole goal is to disconfirm technological exceptionalism, not to offer a replacement theory and associated methods.
As a specific term, technological exceptionalism is tied tightly to internet policy and the field of cyberlaw
itself. In what is referred to as "the law of the horse debate," Frank Easterbrook famously analogized internet law, as a field of study, to the law of the horse. Easterbrook took issue with devising a field around an object, instead preferring legal fields be categorized as broad concepts and issues that touch all objects:
contracts, liability, jurisdiction, etc. 20 The response for early practitioners and scholars of cyberlaw was to point out that the internet was completely different across all those fronts, it needed its own special treatment. 21 Perhaps because cyberlaw was defending a position of exceptional novelty to maintain its relevance, earlier work, such as that from Lawrence Tribe, on the subject of law and technological change have only be rediscovered and utilized recently, in a period of reflection for the field.
The debate has moved from the virtual to the physical, now revolving around the internet of things and robotics. Calo explains that law is finally catching up with the internet, but "technology has not stood still."
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He argues that robotics will be the next transformative technology and that its essential qualities are more exceptional than those of the internet. Calo builds his argument by first establishing that it is the internet's essential qualities of connection, collaboration, and control gave rise to the field of cyberlaw and "end up driving a particular conversation across a wide swath of cyberlaw issues." 23 He then explains that robotics has distinct essential qualities, distinction from the internet's characteristics, of social valence (evocation of anthropomorphization), emergence (adaptive behavior), and embodiment (ability to physically act on the world), which will require its own and special legal treatment. 24 Jack Balkin responded to Calo's article, writing he does "not think it is helpful to speak in terms of 'essential qualities' of a new technology that we can then apply to law." 25 In this article, the argument furthers Balkin's response by utilizing work and methods in STS and the history of technology.
My argument, bluntly put, is that none of the interpretations American law has made in theory, doctrine, analogical reasoning, or overarching policies must necessarily have followed from the technology's essential qualities. The contemporary American legal community has understood these ICT or cyber technologies through sense-making as academically trained users, political actors with vested interests, cultural entities within institutional structures, and motivated agents of change in a particular time. New technologies' distinctions from legacy technologies are as political as they are technical. Novelty is constructed and as construction is performed the method and politics of this interpretation should not be overlooked. SCOT is limited in four important ways: 1) it focuses on how technologies come to be but not on their consequences; 2) it focuses on the interests that contribute to the construction of technologies while ignoring those impacted but have no voice in the construction; 3) the focus on the immediate interest of those chosen groups that influence technological design, construction, and choice disregards larger cultural or economic influences; and 4) it rejects normative judgements about the alternative interpretations of technology. 37 Technologies potentially have potential consequences -their designs and affordances are not neutral. But, they are not inevitable, nor do they explain large scale society upheaval. Co-production has emerged as a theory within STS and policy that provides a way of acknowledging dialectical, mutual-shaping of the materiality of technological affordances an object or system extends -the behavior that is allowed by the design of a technological artifact 38 -as well as the social construction of technology, paying particular attention to the surrounding political influences and social order within specific cultures.
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Technological exceptionalism in cyberlaw is deterministic in two particular ways. First, it insists that technology drives legal change because it drives social change. Second, this linear relationship wherein law follows technology, is a response to the technology's declared functionality, ignoring Balabanian's other elements and the co-constituting described by Jasanoff. Technological exceptionalism suggests a necessary impact on society and law instead of recognizing, critiquing, or guiding the cultural/legal construction of technology. By ignoring the cultural and political interpretation of technology and focusing on functionality, technological exceptionalism appears, by the end of the next section, to be perhaps little more than American exceptionalism masquerading as a theory of law and technological change.
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Testing the Theory of Technological Exceptionalism
To test the theory of technological exceptionalism, we should try to find it. If the functionality of technology drives social values and legal change in the linear fashion organized by technological exceptionalism, we should certainly be able to identify ample evidence of it throughout history. If any technology were to be exceptional, the printing press and/or the internet are surely such, introducing technical functionality so new that they must have changed societies in particular ways and demanded particular legal protections.
From the Print Press to Cyberspace
The printing press is well-understood to be one of, if not the, most important technical innovations of all time and credited with ushering in both readership and authorship that magnitudes unknown prior or since. Johannes Gutenberg holds the reputation for inventing moveable type -the technological shift were so complex, it was still easier to use hand-written characters were still more efficient. Public historian John Man explains that printing was inevitable ("an invention waiting to happen"), because the culture and political climate of Europe at the time was primed to embrace and promote such technology and develop wide-ranging use. 46 Romans had developed a simpler alphabet, the Chinese had proliferated paper and paper production, and a number of European countries contributed to social disruption associated with political and religious unrest -all essential to the success of the printing press. Gutenberg should certainly be credited for proliferation of the printing press; his involvement in creating the infrastructure for print as a gifted entrepreneur to be a commercial success and later his resentment toward his business partners' attempts to maintain exclusive control of the technology were vital to its success. However, the functionality of printing technologies cannot be said to have arisen through the independent genius of a single man nor to have caused social change that would necessitate certain laws. It would be centuries before ideas of authorship, ownership, economics, governance, and control would culminate in the first copyright laws.
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And as discussed above, the internet was the initial technology to spur the debate using the term technological exceptionalism, but certainly not the first time that scholars have debated the legally relevant novelty of technology. Even though there are many internets (culturally and materially), the internet is referred to in a singular narrow sense. Often the Communication Decency Act is used an example of how of the work done in the 1960s and 1970s around privacy and data protection attempting to convince the public and policymakers that "new" information processing technologies were new threats that needed new laws, but Westin described an array of technologies he found concerning: the radio transmitter microphones that allow conversations to be overheard without the consent of both parties to a conversations (phone tapping), a "radio pill" that emitted a signal from within the body, secret "miniature still and movie cameras with automatic light meters" that can be triggered by movement (motion detection cameras), long range photography equipment and closed-circuit television units the size of a cigarette pack, beepers smaller than a quarter that transmit a signal for several city blocks, audial surveillance that can be built into one's attire, photochromic micro-images, computer storage and processing, credit and debit card systems, polygraphs, and personality tests. 53 He listed these technologies during the civil rights era when Congress was actively passing laws to protect new ideas about personhood. These technologies existed in a moment in time, a state of being, and Western democracies -the setting was often referred to as a surveillance state, and the state, it was argued, needed to change.
Or, perhaps it is that we are asking too much of exceptionalism -both technical and legal context arguably matter to the theory. In the next section, the brownie -the hand-held photographic machine that supposedly led to the modern right to privacy -will be addressed using a more narrow scope. It will be followed by a similar analysis of commercial drones. In the end, the result is the same: technology does not drive history and it does not drive law. It is only part of the story. New technologies come into being dynamically in social settings made up of existing technologies, uses and users, norms and aspirations.
Photographs and Brownies
Privacy law and cyberlaw sit upon historical groundings that inevitably involve a reference to Warren This succinct story is not quite accurate or is at least incomplete. It is true that Warren and Brandeis were particularly concerned about "instantaneous photography" (though the opinion of two lawyers should not be considered definitive about the larger social relationship between camera technology and a social problem about privacy), the two were not determinists in three major ways: 1) They acknowledged a change in news and celebrity culture. 2) They were anticipating a technology -the Brownie in 1890 was heavy and expensive. It would not become a "democratizing" information technology for another twenty years. Law here is not following technology. 3) They recognized that other national legal cultures had developed in different yet relevant ways not dependent on the function of the snap camera.
Warren and Brandeis described cultural shifts related to news and celebrity, and scholars have noted Warren's socialite status and frustration with the increasingly invasive press. 56 Samantha Barbas has written extensively on this subject in her book Laws of Image. She explains:
Like the surge in libel litigation, the development of the right to privacy was a response to the sensationalistic popular press. It also reflected a historical shift in the ways that Americans, particularly middle-class city dwellers, were conceptualizing their social identities and presenting themselves to others. It was a reaction to a new sensitivity to personal image that grew from the demands of social life in an increasingly urban, commercial, mass-mediated society, where appearances, first impressions, and superficial images were becoming important foundations of social evaluation and judgment. Barbas emphasizes that the "visual revolution" was facilitated by image technologies like the Kodak camera, but that a number of changes in understandings of the self, migration patterns, architecture, and relationships toward others are all part of the story of privacy and the desire and right to control one's image.
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Other cultural historians have emphasized the way enhanced attention to feeling, emotion, and sentiment changed the sense of self and this recognition's role in the right to privacy.
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In 1888, George Eastman introduced the snap camera to the market with the slogan, "You press the button, we do the rest." This the camera that Warren and Brandeis would have been referring to in 1890. While
Eastman's vision was to produce an easy to use camera that took the technical and chemical elements out of processing the film, the camera cost $25. When one hundred pictures of the film were shot, the camera was mailed to Eastman Kodak, where the film was developed by skilled specialists for $10. The camera was then loaded with new film and returned, followed by the prints when they were finished. This relatively expensive equipment and process was enthusiastically adopted by amateur photographers, who came to be known as Kodakers, because Eastman's product had become standard among many inexpensive, small cameras on the market at the time. 60 The amateur photography craze managed to produce a huge number of photographs that surfaced in every corner of society from advertisements to bulk stacks in dime stores. 61 Described as a seductive, mysterious addiction (even demonic), commentary surrounding photography "arose from a complex interaction between contemporary suspicions about the 'reality' of photographs, and uncertainty about the limitations of the technology, on the one hand, and contemporary bourgeois notions that unguarded facial expressions were reflections of deep and sincere feeling," sometimes referred to as sentimentalism.
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Eastman produced the Pocket Camera in 1895 for $5, which was very popular but still expensive for many. Although spy cameras and the idea of hidden cameras were something of a fascination during this period, they were not commercialized and nothing suggests pocket cameras were of particular concern. It would not be until 1900 that the Brownie would make its debut. Made of a cardboard box and costing only $1, the Brownie was intended to be owned and operated by everyone. In fact, the major marketing campaign was directed at children. Over the turn of the century, the Kodak camera was far from the most angst-inducing technology surfacing. Urban areas were being fitted with electricity, the punch card machine was being introduced for government use, silent movie cinemas were popping up around the country, the electric chair was replacing hangings, and lines were being laid for the telegraph. 63 Perhaps no other technology was more confusing and terrifying than the x-ray. Seeing the inside of the human body was exciting and unnerving and its limits, particularly in combination with these other technological advances, were not well understood. 64 A short essay in an issue of the weekly trade journal, The Electrical Age, refers to personal x-ray cameras and reads "One imaginative contemporary fears that all privacy in human affairs will be gone when the X-ray Kodak fiend is let loose. He will, it is argued, be able to reveal family inner-life, through brick walls, etc., and no one will ever know whether his actions are being 'shadowed' by a perambulating X-ray Kodak crank or not." (17:6, 103 (Feb 8, 1896)). In France, the camera -but not necessarily the snap camera -played an important role in the development of a right to privacy. French privacy rights are, like others, one in a bundle of personality rights that also include moral rights of creators for the purposes of copyright, the right to control the use of one's image, and the right to protect one's honor and reputation. Although France, too, is a civil law system, its privacy rights developed in a "remarkably uncivil" way. 67 Without legislation on the books, French judges essentially created a right to oppose the publication of private facts through common law based on tort principles and expanded into recognition of a substantive right to privacy in the 1950s and 1960s. 68 One hundred years prior French courts were already laying the groundwork for the comprehensive system to come based on changing notions of dignity, personhood, and information. 69 These cases paid little attention to the actions or wrong-doing of the defendant. 70 One of the most prominent privacy cases in the country's history illustrates the development of a unique protection of private life and the information producing abilities of the camera. In 1867, the famous Three Musketeers author Alexandre Dumas père filed a claim revolving around a set of untoward photos taken with his mistress, half his age, that were subsequently disseminated by the photographer. Dumas admitted he had sold his rights in the photographs to the man he was suing for publishing them. 71 The Dumas court adopted ideas regarding private life that were expressed when the first law lifting post-Napoleonic censorship of the press was passed in 1819. 72 The court explained that even if a person had consented to exposure, that person must retain the right to withdraw in order to protect his or her dignity. 73 Although a photograph could capture the unsavory behavior of the elite and it expose it to the mass, privacy laws would protect against such indignity. This would remain true as the camera became an object toted by all.
Today the ability to capture an image is as easy and democratized as Eastman could have hoped, but the mantra surrounding photographs and photography has changed from, "You press the button, we do the rest," to "Pics or it didn't happen." Over the time period of that change, the right to know has gained powerful traction in the U.S. 74 while expansive data protection and privacy rights were being codified in Europe. 75 In America, the affordances of the snap camera have become demanding forms of expectation.
The legacy of prior and existing technologies, norms, boundaries, laws, and protections uniquely shapes the way in which legal cultures make sense of "new" technologies.
Computers & Automation
Computers are a curious example of legal constructions of novelty, spanning decades and countries. Like all innovations, the story is one of incremental advancements, uses, political history, and legal institutions. The legally relevant novelty of computers was found more readily in European countries than in the U.S., or at least it was constructed in dramatically different ways. With different concepts of personhood, speech, privacy, autonomy, civic efficiency, and governance, European countries mobilized more quickly around computing technologies in the mid-1900s than the U.S., which easily recognized issues of transparency and errors but was more inclined to politically view computers as solutions to bias, corruption, and waste.
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A slew of data protection laws were passed in European municipalities and countries in the early 1970s to address automated data processing. One of the most crucial challenges facing government in the years immediately ahead is to improve its capacity to administer tax dollars invested in human services. To that end, we are attempting to eliminate ineligibility, overpayment, and other errors from welfare caseloads. We are encouraging local government and public and private service agencies to forge new cooperative links with one another. We are attempting to move away from the fragmented social service structures of the past, which have dealt with individuals and with families as if their problems could be neatly compartmentalized; that is, as if they were not people. Many of these measures could result in more intensive and more centralized record keeping on individuals than has been customary in our society. Potentially, at least, this is a double-edged sword, as the Committee points out. On the one hand, it can help to assure that decisions about individual citizens are made on the basis of accurate, up-to-date information. On the other, it demands a hard look at the adequacy of our mechanisms for guaranteeing citizens all the protections of due process in relation to the records we maintain about them.
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The Committee's strategy "for putting cash directly in the hands of those who need it," was "keeping accurate, up-to-date, easily retrieved records on individual beneficiaries." 84 Although computer-based systems and automation are discussed thoroughly throughout, in its recommendations for safeguards, the distinction between human and computer data collection and use is dropped:
Computer-based systems magnify some record-keeping problems and introduce others, but no matter how data are stored, any maintenance of personal data presents some [] problems… Moreover, the distinction between an automated and non-automated system is not always easy to draw; require safeguards for all personal data systems eliminates the need to rule on ambiguous cases. Uniform application of safeguards to all systems will also facilitate conversion from manual to automated data processing when it does occur.
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The report recommended Congress pass broad legislation to address the collection and use of personal data; this of course, did not happen. The political construction of computers by this group was similar but not exactly the same as working groups in European countries and did not result in legislative action, nor did judicial interpretation establish broad principles of privacy.
A large two-part hearing, 1900s and remaining competitive computing companies to this day (Unisys and IBM respectively). Computing technologies found their way into businesses, governments, and homes, and it is unclear at what moment they were new. If computers drove American law, it is unclear how they did so.
Drones and the Internet of Things
Like the novelty of the snap camera and computers, the novelty of drones depends on its context. Remote control drones were developed not long after planes were introduced into warfare in World War I in 1915 -the Radioplane OQ-2 was the first remote control aircraft the beginning of World War II in 1939. Amateur UAV (unmanned aerial vehicles) technologies benefited from some of the military innovations, but remote control model aircrafts predate both world wars -they were sometimes flown around music halls at the end of the 19 th century. 94 By 1937 subgroups of the R/C community centered around the ham radio managed to produce six entrants for a national R/C model plane contest (only three of which were actually able to get their planes to fly for even a few seconds). systems easier to fly by less skilled operators, more resilient under various conditions, and better sensors to promote both information gathering and safety, have developed more recently. Drones, depending on how they operate, are considered a category within robotics in legal scholarship and policy debates in the U.S. They have been incredibly challenging for U.S. regulators, so much so that three states put moratoriums on drones until their legislatures had time to fully consider the matter 95 and the FAA effectively did the same by prohibiting commercial drones until they passed regulations. In a potentially anti-innovation moment in U.S. history, drones have been significantly delayed while waiting for regulations to be passed, much to the chagrin and resentment of U.S. drone makers who claim America is ceding its technological lead and place in the market to other countries. Is it because drones are so technologically exceptional that they require all new laws which take a long time to pass?
Based on this policy treatment one can see how the new capabilities of light-weight, semi-autonomous flying objects would need a legal overhaul, but other countries have not had the same hurdles or followed the same timeline. Similar to the U.S., European countries have size and location restrictions, as well as licensing and insurance schemes in place. Privacy is a different matter. As a surveillance tool, are drones new? Are they exceptional? Because European countries have had comprehensive data protection regimes in place that regulate data practices generally and have utilized visual surveillance technologies to monitor the public at least since the late 1970s and European Union countries since the 1990s, drones are arguably much newer in the U.S. than elsewhere.
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In the U.K., for instance, using a drone to capture the image of an individual without her consent could be a violation of the Data Protection Act ("If a drone has a camera, it is covered by the Data Protection Act."
)
or the CCTV Code of Practice. 97 To reiterate: drones were added to the CCTV governance strategy in the U.K. If you want to understand how to responsibly use a drone in public, you can go to section 7 of the Code of Practice, titled "Surveillance Technologies Other than CCTV Systems," that explains, "While the technologies covered in this section present new issues, the recommendations throughout the rest of this code will still be relevant." 98 The section does not detail the new issues but emphasizes that UAVs are to be treated like others discussed in the document and also specifically addresses facial recognition and body cameras in these terms. Although surveillance is a key mode of ordering in modern capitalism 99 based on a rationale of risk-management around the globe, 100 video surveillance in the UK has been normalized over the course of the 1990s and uniquely flourished in the area. 101 Privacy's "other path" and late embrace of the ECHR in the UK provided little footing for legal challenges of video surveillance technologies.
Germany, on the other hand, pioneered data protection after experience with totalitarianism, fascism, Staff acknowledges the practical difficulty of providing choice when there is no consumer interface and recognizes that there is no one-size-fits-all approach. Some options include developing video tutorials, affixing QR codes on devices, and providing choices at point of sale, within set-up wizards, or in privacy dashboards. Whatever approach a company decides to take, the privacy choices it offers should be clear and prominent, and not buried within lengthy documents. 105 All these provide recommendations are mobile and internet-based, wherein the data collected is from the user with whom operators have a direct relationship. The Article 29 Working Party (A29WP), an independent body made up of representatives from the data protection authorities across the E.U. to provide expert advice to member states and the Commission, published an opinion focused mainly quantified self technologies, as well as household automation devices like smart light bulbs and toasters. 111 The Opinion emphasized six concerns about personal information: lack of control and information asymmetry, quality of consent, inferences derived from data, patterns and profiling, limitations on anonymity, and security risks. 112 The A29WP was able to provide specific recommendations to a number of parties., that essentially mirror those that from the General Data Protection Regulation.
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The FTC and the A29WP approach the internet of other people's things in slightly different ways, but both treat the object connected future as an extension of the internet and big data policy issues. The institutions describe future by detailing the underlying IoT, which are simply connected devices that are smart by utilizing big data. When considering, debating, and regulating emerging technology, framing matters.
Various legal cultures reflect, what science and technology studies scholar Sheila Jasanoff calls, diverse "civic epistemologies" that shape the way in which policy issues are framed. In this instance, there is little variation in the way in which the technology itself is framed, which is a missed opportunity. Of course IoT is an extension of the internet, big data, robotics, algorithmic living, and a number of other computational shifts, all of which present new forms of newness every day.
Arguably, the newness that matters here is the loss of the screen and data collection of individuals who have no direct relationship to the device -the problem of the internet of other people's things. But, only if agency personnel are interested in pushing dramatically new, potential costly, policies. And, neither institution constructed IoT in this way. They missed the opportunity to achieve what both appear to be pursuing -establish meaningful digital privacy for the future. How is such a lapse explained? There is, of course, much more going on here than rules and technological affordances.
Revisiting the Pacing Problem
We do not find technological exceptionalism in the mid-1400s, we do not find it in the late 1800s, we do not find it at the turn of either centuries and we do not find it today -at least not from the technological advancements of the printing press, the snap camera, computers, the internet, or drones. Just because technological exceptionalism has not occurred does not mean that it could never happen. The reason that technological exceptionalism could never happen is because technology is so much more than function -because technology is far more socially constructed (from conception by creators to adaptation by the very latest users) than the theory of technological exceptionalism allows for. Historian and sociologist of science Steven Shapin explains:
The story of how we came to terms with the new technology-how we adjusted to it, adapted to it, domesticated it, altered it to suit our purposes-didn't come with the technical spec sheet. It never does. No instruction manual can explain how a technology will evolve, in use, together with the rhythm of our lives.
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By acknowledging the social construction of novelty within a legal system the pacing problem also comes into question. Not only does law not linearly follow technology, a great deal of legal work shapes technology and the way in which it will be understood in the future.
Scholars, judges, regulators, and legislators often make sense of technologies in a way that is forward-look- These are somewhat unique to American culture in relation to technology and American legal culture, which both exist within a political environment intent on fostering innovation for economic and social gains. 118 When and where novelty is not associated with prosperity, progress, and national identity is it so readily observed by the legal community?
The OncoMouse, the first animal to be patented in the U.S., 119 represents a particularly contentious moment of international technological construction. Genetic modification was not considered particularly novel in the U.S. 120 American patent law exempts "products of nature" to prevent monopolies on things found in nature. In the 1970s a General Electric research engineered a bacterium and filed for a patent, which eventually made its way to the Supreme Court in 1980, wherein the majority concluded there was no relevant difference between living and nonliving organisms. 121 An influential amicus brief filed by Genetech explained how it produced human insulin by injecting it into bacteria, but also distinguished bacteria from living animals that are protected by various laws and policies. The incrementally was persuasive and the benefits convincing. The OncoMouse was engineered to be predispose to cancer and public outcry resulted in a five year moratorium on animal patenting, but was lifted and hundreds of patents have been filed since 1993 supporting a thriving biotech industry in the U.S. In fact, the OncoMouse had his own t-shirts that reads "Stalking Cancer" portraying the animal as a scientific superhero. Instead it is an analysis of the term "robot" used by judges over five decades. In other words, it is an excellent example of the legal construction of technology.
Other pursuits may include analyzing technological framing in policy debates, 130 technological metaphors in judicial analogical reasoning, 131 and technological expertise in legislative and regulatory bodies. 132 Limits to the legal construction of technology are similar to those of SCOT; normative claims are difficult though not impossible to assert using these pursuits and methods. But, cyberlaw scholarship excels at normative claims and has managed, without notice, to achieve both construction and normative assertions.
Some have relied on critical theory to engage in work with ties to the new fields of critical information theory and critical data theory practiced in information science, communication fields, and media studies.
As outlined by Siva Vaidhyanathan, Critical Information Studies investigates: 1) the abilities and liberties to use, revise, criticize, and manipulate cultural texts, images, ideas, and information; 2) the rights and abilities of users to alter the means and techniques through which cultural texts and information are rendered, displayed, and distributed; 3) the relationship among information control, property rights, technologies, and social norms; and 4) the cultural, political, social, and economic ramifications of global flows of culture and information. 133 Critical Data Studies has also emerged as a related field of study, wherein big data is questioned and analyzed not as scientifically empirical but as already constituted within social structures and contexts. Both poke and prod to question the assumptions underlying information technology design, power relationships, and regulation with a particular focus on copyright and more recently privacy.
A prominent example is Julie Cohen's work on outdated ideas of the self within both copyright and privacy law as detailed in her book Configuring the Networked Self.
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"Law in action," or perhaps here "cyberlaw in action," is a fundamental idea in socio-legal studies wherein the way in which law actually plays itself out in society is examined -beyond statutes and cases. Ken- social problem that requires a legal change based on some recognized policy outcome is certainly a worthy set of research steps to take. Importantly, this approach also acknowledges the possibility of an effect -the potential for a causal relationship when one may exist, something legal construction does not lend itself to discovering. But, any approach must also be analyzed and criticized. What were the methodological choices of the researcher and why were they chosen? What assumptions about technology, society, and law are the researcher making and why? Danielle Citron's work on cyber civil rights, for example, is particularly careful across these methodological steps. 138 It should also be stressed that the alternative approaches listed are not necessarily based on an alternative theory of technological change. The scholars undertaking these approaches may very well be operating in a technologically deterministic mindset or consider themselves technological exceptionalists. This is particularly evident in the area of anticipatory governance, where much time is spent looking at the technological functionalities in research developments on university campuses, Silicon Valley, and science fiction novels. The argument here is not that some scholars are doing good research and others bad research, but that some are utilizing technological exceptionalism in more explicit or reliant ways than others and that utilization of such a deterministic theory of technological change is not justified. Legal construction of technology occurs, as Kaminski writes, "by placing [technology] into doctrinal or statutory categories; by situating it within institutional arrangements; by subjecting it to information-gathering; and by making assumptions about how technology fits into regulatory setting against which the law operates." 139 Even before technology arrives at moments of formal construction in judicial opinions or legislation, researchers, judges, and policy-makers come to the technology with some sense-making apparatus at work. Perhaps a powerful individual loves driving or hates traffic or largely rejects new technologies and sees use as a choice; perhaps an institution has a long-standing goal to be seen as pro-innovation to avoid budget cuts; perhaps a wider sentiment that society has become dangerously unstable and constant disruption needs to take a back seat to established trust takes root. Much legal construction of novelty is negotiated between parties and governing bodies, which may occur across media campaigns, the press, multi-stakeholder meetings, and targeted lobbying. By focusing on the technology's function and giving it deterministic power, cyberlaw has not developed (or acknowledged its own) rich understanding of the way in which law, in numerous, varied ways, constructs novelty. 
Conclusion
Back in 1996, Sheila Jasanoff explained in her foundational STS book, Science at the Bar, "The law today not only interprets the social impacts of science and technology but also constructs the very environment in which science and technology come to have meaning, utility, and force." 142 At the same time, the field of cyberlaw was being newly created and foundations laid by early legal scholar pioneers. One of these foundations for understanding law and the internet in terms of governance and technological change was technological exceptionalism -that dramatic technological change necessitates systematic legal change. After three decades, we can look back on technological exceptionalism and assess its utility and validity, using both interdisciplinary fields. As the analytic case studies show, such drama is contextual, political, and culturally constructed, and nothing necessitates legal change. Upon reflection, no sound example of technological exceptionalism can be found and will not be found, because the theory is too technologically deterministic to accurately reflect the rich landscape of governance and technological change. Cyberlaw scholarship has already begun, though subtly and without recognition, to develop work beyond the linearity provided by technological exceptionalism. As this work continues, it is also important to develop methodological and theoretical foundations, discussions, and critique to shape and reinforce rigor within the field of cyberlaw. 
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